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Private school enrolment may lead to worse subsequent performance in further edu-
cation or in the labour market. If students differ in their ability not only to pay but to
take advantage of educational opportunities (“talent” for short), private schools attract
a worse pool of students when publicly funded schools are better suited to foster
progress by more talented students. In the data we analyze, the impact of observable
talent proxies on educational and labour market outcomes is indeed more positive for
students who (endogenously) choose to attend public schools than for those who
choose to pay for private education.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Expensive private schools are supposed to be better than free public
schools, because they would be priced out in equilibrium if they did not of-
fer a better service to their students. In Italy and other countries, however,
private schools do not always project a high-quality image, and the educa-
tional and labour market careers of private-school graduates are not as bril-
liant as one might expect. The “diploma no problem” advertising pitch of at
least some Italian private schools motivates Brunello - Rocco (2004) to show
that private schools endowed with degree-granting powers may indeed be
worse than public schools when the latter enforce demanding standards, so
*This paper is part of a project carried out in the framework of the PRIN 2005 “Institutio-
nal configuration, schooling choices, and labor and financial markets” research group, co-fun-
ded by MIUR and our Universities. We are grateful for that support and opportunities to present
preliminary results at the group’s 2006 and 2007 workshops in Turin. We also gratefully ackno-
wledge the useful criticism and very helpful suggestions of Anna Chung, of an anonymous refe-
ree, and of the editor, Tullio Jappelli.
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that residual demand for private education comes from students who are fi-
nancially well endowed but find it hard to meet the performance require-
ments of public schools. Bertola - Checchi (2004), finding empirically that
university performance is worse in the case of students who attended priva-
te schools, similarly argue that at least some Italian private schools play a
remedial role: they are attended by low achievers and, while improving their
performance, cannot bring it up to the level of public school students. 
This paper focuses on whether and how individual school choices may
be driven by the different suitability of private and public schools to educa-
tion of students who differ in their ability to make use of educational re-
sources (“talent”, for short, regardless of whether such ability is innate or de-
termined by earlier life experiences). Theoretically, we outline how the choi-
ces of individuals endowed with heterogeneous and financial resources and
heterogeneous talent may be shaped by the different relationship, across dif-
ferently expensive schools, between individual talent and desirable outco-
mes. Empirically, we seek evidence of such heterogeneity and choices in da-
ta Italian youth who completed secondary education at public or private
schools three years before being interviewed.
Section 2 briefly reviews theoretical insights and empirical results from
previous studies of the determinants and effects of private schooling choices,
and lays down a simple formal model of how students’ may be sorted across
private and public schooling along two theoretically relevant dimensions:
their families’ ability to pay, and their own “talent”. When the two types of
school offer different rewards to differently talented students, sorting of stu-
dents along that dimension depends on whether the relationship between out-
comes and talent is steeper at private or public schools.  Section 3 discusses
how empirical work may estimate such parameters, reviewing earlier studies
of Italian data and focusing in particular on whether and how econometric
procedures may let researchers disentangle the relevant notion of student ta-
lent from other innate and background influences on their schooling choices
and achievements. Section 4 implements instrumental variable and selection-
controlled estimation techniques on datasets resulting from surveys of youth,
three years after graduating from private or public schools, carried out by the
national institute of statistics (ISTAT) between 1998 and 2004 in Italy. While
estimation has to rely on unavoidably debatable identification assumptions,
the results of a variety of regressions of study and work outcomes on mea-
sures of talent, family background, and school choice all suggest that Italy
does have “low quality” private sector, which attracts relatively rich but diffi-
cult students, and offers relatively uniform returns to heterogeneously talen-
ted individuals. Section 5 concludes discussing briefly how this finding and
further research may inform policy choices.
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2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In an economy where schooling choices can be based on the (observa-
ble) ability of youth to take advantage of educational resources, efficiency
would call for more costly schools to be attended by students who are (in
that sense) more “talented”. Should financial markets be perfect and all edu-
cation private, families could optimally choose their offspring’s education.
The resulting equilibrium would feature a larger aggregate amount (and a
more efficient pattern) of investments in education, as well as higher ine-
quality, as in Glomm - Ravikumar (1992), than a public education system of
uniform quality chosen on the basis of  the median voter’s objectives, as in
Stiglitz (1974).
Since in reality information about students’ ability is asymmetric and fi-
nancial markets are imperfect and incomplete, the allocation of educational
resources is not necessarily efficient. Publicly and privately funded schools
coexist in all educational system, and the composition of their student bo-
dies is heterogeneous for a variety of reasons and in different ways. As in De
Fraja (2002), if individual human capital formation is increasing both in in-
dividual students’ ability and in the amount of educational resources avai-
lable to them, it is efficient to spend more in the education of more talented
students: private markets tend to sort brighter and richer students in more
expensive schools, and public policy may, under asymmetric information,
subsidize high-quality schools more than lower-quality ones in order to co-
ordinate efficiently the self-sorting of students along the relevant dimen-
sions.1 The equilibrium has broadly similar features if the quality of students
itself drives schooling choices and outcomes, in that individual formation of
human capital is positively affected by average ability in the school through
“peer effects”. Then, schools that admit the best students are more attracti-
ve to all students, and private schools’ fee and admission policies result in
an equilibrium hierarchy of school quality, with inexpensive public schools
as the lowest layer and private schools attracting richer and more talented
students (Epple - Romano, 1998). 
In most models of this type, the public schooling chosen by the politi-
cal process is low-cost, and low-quality. But this need not be fully realistic.
As in Brunello - Rocco (2004), the public standard of quality can be high
enough to exclude less talented students, some of whom are rich enough to
1 Stratification on ability and/or family income is also efficient in the model of Fernandez -
Gali (1999), where individual ability and school quality (measured by average ability) are com-
plements (positive assortative mating). On the optimality of school stratification by student abi-
lity see also Robertson - Symons (2003).
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pay a price to be admitted into less demanding private schools. In such a ca-
se, the private school gathers low ability students from richer families. 
Empirical evidence, in fact, is mixed as regards performance differen-
ces across public and private segments of school systems. Vendenberghe -
Robin (2004) estimate the impact of private schooling on competences of 15-
year-old students in PISA 2000 survey, and find that selection into private
schools (as determined by location) has very heterogeneous effects across co-
untries. Private attendance is associated to better competences in Brazil, Bel-
gium, France, to worse competences in the Netherlands and in Austria, and
has no statistical effects in all other countries. On the same dataset Dron-
kers - Robert (2003) compare competences across private “independent”
(less than 50% of funds from private sources) and “government-dependent”
schools, finding a positive partial correlation (after controlling for a com-
prehensive set of OLS covariates) between student performance and priva-
te government-dependent school enrolment; and Woessman (2006) studies
the impact of private-public partnership onto student performance, finding
that different levels of aggregations offer different information inasmuch as
they are differently affected by selection bias. 
2.1 A simple formal framework
We proceed to formulate a potentially estimable formal specification of
the process by which heterogeneous students are sorted across private and
publicly-funded schools. Since our data will only allow us to consider choi-
ces and outcomes at the level of individual students, we disregard the issue
of whether differences in returns to education reflect peer effects, as in Ep-
ple - Romano (1998), or the amount of resources invested in education, as
in De Fraja (2002), or perhaps their composition. All that matters to students
is the private cost of education, which of course is lower than its social cost
in the case of free or subsidized public education, and its private payoff in
terms of further school achievement or labour market performance. It is si-
milarly immaterial, for our purposes, whether students’ ability to learn (or
“talent”) reflects innate or background influences. 
Crucially, we let the payoffs of interest to students’ families (in terms
of educational attainment, employment probability, or expected future in-
come) depend not only on the type (and cost) of school and on talent, but
also on the interaction between the two. Formally, supposing that the pa-
yoff of education Y is a linear function of talent (denoted θ) of children in-
dexed by i, 
, (1)
we let the parameters of this relationship differ across schools indexed by j.
Yi j j i= +α β θ
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Denoting the tuition fee charged by school j with ϕj, we allow its rele-
vance to school choice to differ across families: family i’s welfare is decrea-
sed by if its offspring is enrolled in school j. This type of hetero-
geneity represents the implications of wealth inequality under borrowing
constraints, which generally imply that the consumption impact of educa-
tional investments is heavier for poorer families (in the absence of financial
market imperfections, conversely, the allocation of students to different
schools would be the socially optimal one, hence independent of wealth dis-
tribution).
Suppose for simplicity that only two types of schools are available. Choi-
ces aimed at maximizing each child’s achievement, net of costs, lead indivi-
dual i to attend school 2 when
, (2)
and school 1 otherwise. Let public schools have index 1, so that ϕ2 > ϕ1 (pri-
vate schools charge higher fees): as long as 
, (3)
condition (2) identifies the talent and discount rate combinations that lead
students to the two schools. The indifference condition for a family with dis-
count rates ri identifies a lower bound on the talent level for enrolment in
the school with the steeper influence of talent on outcomes:
(4)
When the public school indexed by 1 offers the smaller reward to talent, then
highly talented students self-sort into private, as in panel (a) of Figure 1. For
given talent, however, enrolment in (expensive) private schools is a more at-
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FIGURE 1 - Different returns to talent and student choices
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tractive choice for richer families which (in the presence of financial mar-
ket imperfections) apply a smaller discount rate to future returns. By equa-
tion (4), when β1 < β2 the indifference locus of families’ choices is positively
sloped in the space of talent and discount rates, as shown in panel (a) of Fi-
gure 2. In this case, as in Epple - Romano (1998) or De Fraja (2002), more
talented and richer students choose the schools where talent has better re-
turns, and the model unambiguously predicts better outcomes for private-
school students.2
If instead the less expensive public school rewards talent more strongly
(β2 < β1) then, as in panel (b) of Figure 1, it attracts better students than pri-
vate schools (which continue to be more likely to be attended by richer stu-
dents, for given talent). Then, the indifference condition (4) implies a nega-
tively sloped dividing line in talent and interest rate space, as shown in pa-
nel (b) of Figure 2. While it remains true that private schools attract richer
students, the pool of students attracted by private schools is of lower qua-
lity. Expensive schools are indeed better suited to making the best of their
students’ relatively low talent. But it is no longer the case that private school
attendance tends to produce better outcomes, because public school stu-
dents are better endowed with “talent” and their educational experience ma-
kes better use of their ability.
This simple framework suggests that private schools are always atten-
ded by richer students if financial markets are imperfect, but are “better” (in
terms of their students’ outcomes) than public schools only if private fun-
2 The indifference condition segments the population only if it is satisfied in the interior
of the variables’ support. If the measure of “talent” can only be positive in the relevant popula-
tion,  parameter configurations  such that imply that one
schooling technology completely dominates the other, which is never chosen.
β β α α β β α α2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2> ∪ > > ∪ > or 
r
(a) (b)
private
public
public
private
r
θ θ
FIGURE 2 - Selection into schools
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ding is spent on resources that complement student talent, so that private
schools attract a better student population. If instead public schools are con-
figured so as to attract the higher quality segment of the student population,
the model can explain the worse performance of students who attended pri-
vate schools, as found, for example, by Bertola - Checchi (2004): even though
paying more for education must be beneficial to those students, attending
private schools need not lift relatively untalented students to the level of tho-
se who attended “good” public schools. 
3. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
It is important to assess more precisely the empirical realism of lower
sensitivity to “talent” of more expensive private schools, because whether pri-
vate schools are indeed “worse” in that sense has potentially very important
implications for the distributional impact of public school design and fun-
ding policies, as well as of voucher programs, across differently well-endo-
wed students.  To find out whether private schooling complements or sub-
stitutes students’ talent in determining life outcomes, one might estimate the
empirical equivalent of equation (1) on data from different school types, and
compare the estimated slope coefficients to see whether talent is rewarded
more by private or public education. This is not easy in practice, however,
both because it is necessary to account for selection of students into diffe-
rent school types, and because available data need not correspond closely to
the theory’s variables.
If selection of students into private schools were only based on their ta-
lent, it would be possible to assess their “quality” by simply comparing the
composition of private schools’ student pools to that of public schools. But
selection is also driven in the model by households’ financial conditions and
in the real world by additional heterogeneity along religious, ideological,
geographical, and other dimensions that need not bear on students’ outco-
mes. The relevant variables may or may not be observable, and even when
they are it is difficult to detect in available data information about the theo-
retically relevant notions of schooling-relevant talent and schooling-related
outcomes. Parental education, household income and wealth, and other stu-
dent background information influence a child’s ability to learn as well as
the family’s ability to pay to for private schooling. Strong identifying as-
sumptions are needed, in the absence of experimental variation, in order to
disentangle the two relevant dimensions in background and earlier outcome
data. 
Formally, an empirical selection equation relates an individual’s pro-
pensity of attending a private school to an observable talent indicator θpi*
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and to a vector Z of observable covariates, 
(5)
where γs and δ are coefficients to be estimated and ε the error term. Only ac-
tual attendance is observed, so the dependent variable of any empirical esti-
mation procedure is a dummy variable that equals one when
individual i attends private school, zero otherwise. To implement estimation,
it is necessary to specify the functional form both of the observable selec-
tion mechanism and of the (unobservable) error term’s distribution, and to
have information about individual talent θi, available financial resources,
and other determinants of school choices.
The only available outcome in the second stage of the estimation pro-
cedure, relates individual performance to observables: 
, (6)
where the dummy variable pi equals unity when private school 2 is attended,
and allows both the intercept and the intensity of talent’s effect to differ in
that case. What is interesting, from our theoretical perspective, is whether
the interaction of talent and private school attendance is negative ( <0), to
imply that private schooling offers smaller rewards to talent but, as the in-
tercept is higher at private schools ( >0), it may still be preferred to public
schools by low-talent students.
To identify the parameters of interest without excessive reliance on func-
tional forms, it is necessary to bring structural considerations to bear on
which of the covariates collected in the vector Zi belong in each of the se-
lection and outcome equations (5) and (6), i.e., to impose prior restrictions
on the and coefficient vectors. We address this difficult issue below
in the context of a discussion of the available Italian dataset’s suitability to
our purposes.
3.1 Data
Students and their families are of course highly heterogeneous along a
variety of dimensions, and public and private also differ in important re-
spects highlighted by several other recent studies of Italian evidence. Chec-
chi - Jappelli (2007) find in the 1993 Survey of Household Income and
Wealth, administered by the Bank of Italy to a representative sample of the
Italian population, that the probability of enrolling children in private
schools is higher in localities where public schools supply low-quality edu-
cation, on the basis of subjective or objective (such as student/teacher ratios)
γ Oγ S
α˜
β˜
Y p p Zi i i i i O yi
* [ ˜ ] [ ˜]= + + + + +α α β β θ γ ε
p I pi i= >( )
* 0
p Zi i S i pi
*
= + +γ θ δ ε
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measures. Private schools may attract students for reasons other than their
educational quality, as shown by the data tabulated in Table 1 from a repre-
sentative sample of Italian families in a survey conducted in 1998 (Indagine
multiscopo). Geographical proximity, services (such as sporting facilities),
and ideology all play a role in generating demand for private education.
Using the same dataset, Brunello - Checchi (2005) show that students en-
rolled private schools are significantly more likely to use expensive (and
usually remedial) individual private tutoring, and characterize their back-
ground and aspirations using the PISA 2000 survey data: among other fac-
tors, private schooling is motivated by better standards of education as well
as by parents who are busy enough to appreciate not having to help their
children with homework.
In this paper, we analyze the information contained in surveys conduc-
ted by the national institute for statistics (ISTAT) in 1998, 2001 and 2004 on
a sample of individuals who had completed secondary school three years be-
fore being interviewed (1995, 1998 and 2001 respectively).  
A first difficult problem is that of finding in the data a counterpart to
the theoretical model’s “talent” variable (defined as students’ ability to ma-
ke use of educational resources, regardless of whether it is innate or deter-
mined by their early life experiences).  The available dataset, unlike those
available to Harmon - Walker (2000), Blau - Kahn (2005), or Green - Riddell
(2003), does not include IQ or competence test results, which would ar-
guably be more relevant to labour market outcomes. What is available is in-
formation about the respondent’s previous school career: marks at the end
of compulsory education and at the end of secondary school, and number
of grade repetitions (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics in the sample).3
These variables convey information about individual-specific innate or back-
ground-based ability to learn in secondary school, which is a crucial deter-
minant of private vs. public school choice in our framework. They may or
may not be relevant to individual ability to do well in further stages of life
independently of schooling experiences. This is not a problem as we aim to
explain further educational and labour market outcomes with estimation
procedures that attempt to use instrumental variables to disentangle the de-
terminants of previous school choices. As a summary observable counterpart
to model’s “talent” variable, we construct from the three school-career va-
riables a single-dimensional indicator, whose coefficient will correspond to
the theoretical model’s slope, using factor analysis (principal component me-
3 This is by construction a self-selected sample, since it includes only students who have
completed upper secondary school at the age of 19; in Italy, education was only compulsory up
to age 15 when the survey data were collected. 
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thod, see Table 3 for the results). The indicator accounts for more than half
of the total variance of the three variables.
As to the outcomes, the only available information regards the survey
respondents’ status three years after completing secondary school. Each in-
dividual may be enrolled in a university, may be employed or searching for
a job, or may be out of the labour market (military service, housewife, ap-
prenticeship in liberal professions, scholarship). Table 4 reports sample fre-
quencies.4 A sizeable fraction of respondents is enrolled at university and
working at the same time. This may indicate that household liquidity con-
straints prevent them from studying full-time, or that uncertainty about their
own willingness and ability to study towards a university degree induces
them to keep open multiple options. While these and other possible ratio-
nales for part-time study are not easy to relate to our simple theoretical per-
spective on talent, financial resources, and schooling choices, the results re-
ported here include part-time study outcomes in the sample (their exclusion
has very minor impact on the results).
Our regressions’ outcome variables are the (discrete) university enrol-
ment status, and the (continuous) amount of earnings when employed. The
former is a good predictor of college graduation, because while university
dropout is frequent in Italy (at a rate of some 13% in the population our
4 The regression results reported in the next Section are rather different across the survey
waves, possibly for structural reasons. In Table 4, the incidence of working status is sharply lo-
wer in 2001, perhaps reflecting the impact of the “Bologna process” degree reorganization that
occurred that year. The shorter degrees offered after the reform may have proved attractive
enough to shift some individuals away from the labor market into tertiary education, leaving in
the labor market individuals whose lower talent implied a higher likelihood of private school at-
tendance, and lower likelihood of university enrolment.
TABLE 1 – Fraction of students less than 18 years old 
enrolled in private schools
PRIMARY
LOWER UPPER
TOTAL
SECONDARY SECONDARY
No specific reason 11.3 11.6 6.1 9.8
No choice (only school available) 7.6 4.8 27.4 12.7
Vicinity 14.8 12.8 11.7 13.5
Services offered 48.9 41.5 26.1 40.8
Cultural (ideological) reasons 14.0 13.4 13.5 13.7
Quality of teaching 36.8 43.4 39.4 38.9
Other reasons 12.5 9.5 5.8 9.9
The table reports the answer to reasons for choosing private schools in a sample of 20,153 households
interviewed in June 1998. Source: ISTAT, 2000, Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie. Famiglia, soggetti so-
ciali e condizione dell’infanzia.
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sample represents) it mostly tends to occur in the first two years of enrol-
ment. Those who report being enrolled after three years are very likely, soo-
ner or later, to obtain a degree. The earnings amount is only observed con-
ditionally on (endogenous) labour market participation and positive ear-
nings (26% of the interviewers who declare to be employed does not report
positive earnings; a small 1.5% proportion reports earnings without decla-
ring to be employed). We estimate below regressions in the form of (6) for
each of these outcomes. 
Household financial resources are not observed in our data, but their ro-
le in determining school choice and/or subsequent outcomes may be proxied
by information on the parents’ education and occupational status. To iden-
tify the determinants and outcome effects of school choice, at least two va-
TABLE 2 – Descriptive statistics – weighted  – ISTAT 1995-1998-2001
1998 2001 2004 
SURVEY DATE (GRADUATE IN 1995) (GRADUATE IN 1998) (GRADUATE IN 2001)
observations 18843 23263 20408
attended a private secondary school 0.134 0.075 0.096
public private public private public private
demographics
female 0.517 0.570 0.535 0.496 0.525 0.461
22 years old 0.584 0.555 0.622 0.510 0.666 0.469
family background
father self-employed 0.291 0.399 0.294 0.419 0.284 0.394
mother self-employed 0.080 0.123 0.071 0.113 0.075 0.112
father college degree 0.077 0.126 0.080 0.159 0.112 0.162
mother college degree 0.058 0.079 0.065 0.116 0.093 0.127
proxies for talent
marks at end of lower secondary:
sufficiente 0.323 0.400 0.308 0.468 0.238 0.361
buono 0.276 0.285 0.271 0.275 0.299 0.342
distinto 0.204 0.177 0.205 0.146 0.222 0.178
ottimo 0.198 0.137 0.216 0.111 0.241 0.119
marks at end of upper secondary:
36 to 41/60 (or 60-69/100) 0.345 0.388 0.342 0.427 0.334 0.406
42 to 47/60 (or 70-79/100) 0.307 0.290 0.300 0.276 0.266 0.270
48 to 53/60 (or 80-89100) 0.195 0.188 0.190 0.159 0.185 0.159
54 to 60/60 (or 90 to100/100) 0.153 0.134 0.169 0.138 0.216 0.164
failed at first year of 
upper secondary school 0.100 0.084 0.074 0.116 0.179 0.401
secondary school track:
vocational 0.158 0.070 0.1666 0.0298 0.1633 0.034
technical school 0.529 0.528 0.5021 0.534 0.4003 0.4693
academic 0.2682 0.375 0.2852 0.4266 0.3173 0.3318
others 0.0447 0.0267 0.0462 0.0096 0.1191 0.1649
outcome variables
currently enrolled in university 0.4266 0.4893 0.4597 0.5108 0.5436 0.5081
currently employed 0.4537 0.4221 0.5277 0.5225 0.4651 0.485
observations with positive wage 5382 598 10719 706 7739 976
net monthly wage (euro) - mean 739.95 706.13 786.55 805.81 862.08 941.17
net monthly wage (euro) - 
standard deviation 432.53 304.01 263.96 274.80 431.08 687.75
Source: ISTAT 1999 - Percorsi di studio e di lavoro dei diplomati - Indagine 1998 (file standard)
ISTAT 2002 - Percorsi di studio e di lavoro dei diplomati - Indagine 2001 (file standard)
ISTAT 1995 - Percorsi di studio e di lavoro dei diplomati - Indagine 2004 (file standard)
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riables are needed to instrument the two endogenous variables on the right-
hand side of specifications in the form of (6): the private schooling dummy,
and its interaction with talent. Suitable variables should affect the choice of
private secondary schooling, but should not directly influence each indivi-
dual’s situation three years after leaving secondary school. 
The survey data include a potentially suitable instrument, as respon-
dents were asked whether at least one grandfather or grandmother had com-
pleted secondary school or college. Since grandchildren of graduate grand-
parents are more likely to be rich, this instrument can influence school choi-
ces through a relaxation of financing constraints as well as by making school
performance more important for a well-educated family. This variable has
already been used to instrument school choices by Cappellari (2004) in the
1998 survey, and is also present in the 2001 survey. The question was not
asked in 2004 survey, which however asked whether the respondent’s family
had paid for individual tutoring lessons during secondary school (question
8.1). A “yes” reply (which is possible by both public and private school stu-
dents) is arguably a reflection of the same forces (academic performance
problems, and financial resources availability) that may trigger private
school enrolment in our theory. To the extent that neither is likely to in-
fluence labour market and university performances directly, availability of
TABLE 3 – Principal component analysis – Proxy for talent –
ISTAT 1995-1998-2001
EIGENVALUE
% EXPL.
VARIANCE
Factor1 1.59513 0.5317
Factor2 0.86718 0.2891
Factor3 0.53769 0.1792
LOADING
UNIQUENESS
FACTORS
marks at end of lower secondary 0.8109 0.3425
marks at end of upper secondary 0.8038 0.3539
failed at first year of upper secondary school -0.5399 0.7085
Source: see note to Table 2.
TABLE 4 – Status of secondary school graduates – ISTAT 1995-1998-2001
SURVEY 1998 2001 2004
just enrolled to college 36.00 34.02 44.77
enrolled to college and working 7.51 12.33 16.97
just working 37.43 40.40 30.15
not working nor studying 19.06 13.25 8.11
Source: see note to Table 2.
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private lessons provides a dummy instrumental variable for that choice.5
Regional dummies may also be suitable instruments, as in DiPietro - Cu-
tillo (2006).  As predictors of private school choices, they may capture rele-
vant factors such as local availability of schools, or religious and political at-
titudes. They may also reflect factors that influence outcomes directly, ho-
wever. For this reason we will also test the results’ robustness to use of fa-
mily background information, and to replacement of regional dummies with
region-level indicators of private school enrolment.
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
The first three columns of Table 5 report marginal effect estimates from
simple probit models of university enrolment three years after secondary
school. Talent is positively correlated with the college enrolment probability
and with private school attendance. The interaction between talent and pri-
vate schooling (parameter in the specification introduced above) is esti-
mated to be negative, but is not significantly different from zero in the two
earlier surveys, and is only significant at 10% in the most recent survey. The
regression, which also controls for the parents’ occupation and education, is
estimated in the next three columns of Table 5 by instrumental variables, trea-
ting the private schooling dummy and its interaction with talent as endoge-
nous variables. The estimated coefficients of the endogenous variables are lar-
ger in the IV specification, suggesting that regional and private-tutoring dum-
mies contain useful information (over and above “talent” as observed in our
data) regarding private school choices. The marginal effects reported in the
table are computed at the sample mean of the regressors, however, and the
interaction’s size and sign may be very different elsewhere. To address this
concern we compute and report in Figure 3 the interaction effects implied by
the IV probit estimates for each observation in the three surveys. The point
estimates of the interaction effects are negative when evaluated at all the ob-
servation-specific values of the variables included in the probit specification.
And the (also observation-specific) standard errors of those estimates indicate
that they are almost always highly significantly different from zero. Thus, in
our data, private secondary schooling makes talent less relevant to university
β˜
5 If family background directly influences the outcomes of interest, these and essentially any
other non-experimental identification strategies are invalid. For example, network connections
may play an important role in a stratified job market. In the data we analyze, however, only about
a quarter of the self-selected sample of individuals who are already working three years after up-
per secondary school graduation report that they found a job through family connections (26.0%
in the 1998 survey, 26.7% in the 2001 survey, 25.2% in the 2004 survey).
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enrolment, consistently with the configuration whereby private
schools are “worse” (in terms of the re-wards they offer to “good” students)
than public ones, as in panel (b) of Figure 1.
In Table 6 we pursue an alternative estimation strategy. To assess the rea-
lism of our model’s framework of analysis, we compare the return to “talent”
in terms of college enrolment probability in separate subsamples of private
and public upper secondary school students. We account for sample selection
by modelling self-selection on the basis of observables (such as age and gen-
der) that are also allowed to influence outcomes, and of the background va-
riables that served as instruments in Table 5 and now play the role of exclu-
sion restriction in the Heckman procedure’s first stage. Talent’s association
with college enrolment is estimated to be positive; consistently with the pre-
vious table’s interaction effects, the coefficient is more positive in the sub-
sample of students from public secondary schools. In the first stage, our mea-
sure of talent is positively associated with public school enrolment, and nega-
tively associated with private school enrolment. While the estimates are stati-
stically significant only in the 1998 and 2004 surveys, the evidence is again
consistent with a “remedial” role for a private school sector offering relatively
low rewards to talent and, therefore, attracting relatively low-talent students.
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FIGURE 3 - Observation-specific marginal interaction effects between talent 
and private and one-sided confidence interval (based on estimates and standard errors
reported by inteff.ado in Stata) for the IV estimates of probability 
of college enrolment reported in Table 5 
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TABLE 6b – Probability of college enrolment – probit and IV probit – 
marginal effects – ISTAT 1998-2001-2004
5 6 7 8
1998 survey (graduate in 1995)
COLLEGE SELECTED COLLEGE SELECTED
PROBIT IF INTO PROBIT IF INTO
PRIVATE PRIVATE PUBLIC PUBLIC
female
0.2368 0.2689 0.112 -0.2676
[2.94]*** [9.70]*** [5.20]*** [9.66]***
22 year old
0.2491 -0.1381 0.0947 0.1356
[3.49]*** [4.68]*** [4.27]*** [4.58]***
talent (1st factor extracted from votes 0.4569 -0.0071 0.5527 0.004
and repetition) [11.26]*** [0.43] [42.27]*** [0.24]
father college degree
0.5657 0.408 0.9772 -0.4238
[4.14]*** [7.43]*** [18.13]*** [7.72]***
mother college degree
0.4497 0.2138 0.7589 -0.2286
[3.11]*** [3.44]*** [12.75]*** [3.69]***
at least one graduate grandparent
0.3987 -0.3482
[9.03]*** [6.68]***
resorting to private tuitions
Observations 21370 21370 21362 21362
Log likelihood -5965.9 -15421.3
Robust z statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Regional dummies included in the selection equation.
TABLE 6a – Probability of college enrolment – probit and IV probit – 
marginal effects – ISTAT 1998-2001-2004
1 2 3 4
1998 survey (graduate in 1995)
COLLEGE SELECTED COLLEGE SELECTED
PROBIT IF INTO PROBIT IF INTO
PRIVATE PRIVATE PUBLIC PUBLIC
female
0.161 0.3022 0.0126 -0.3007
[2.06]** [11.43]*** [0.48] [11.29]***
22 year old
0.1058 -0.0129 0.114 0.0114
[1.60] [0.45] [4.73]*** [0.40]
talent (1st factor extracted from votes 0.512 -0.0553 0.5715 0.0563
and repetition) [12.96]*** [3.76]*** [41.81]*** [3.80]***
father college degree
0.8307 0.1619 1.0224 -0.1538
[6.58]*** [2.93]*** [16.47]*** [2.74]***
mother college degree
0.5315 -0.0806 0.7782 0.0922
[3.34]*** [1.20] [11.66]*** [1.32]
at least one graduate grandparent 
0.2568 -0.2831
[5.61]*** [5.21]***
resorting to private tuitions
Observations 17604 17604 17604 17604
Log likelihood -6951.6 -14393.2
Robust z statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Regional dummies included in the selection equation.
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In Italy, as in other countries, student “quality” is likely very different
and differently rewarded in terms across academic and vocational secondary
school tracks.6 Table 7 allows the private-school interaction effects to differ
across school tracks. The strongest interactions are estimated in the case of
private academic high schools (licei), which seem to be quite effective in fo-
stering high college enrolment probabilities despite low individual talent.
The estimated marginal effects suggest a net contribution in probability of
almost one third (two thirds in the IV estimates). This suggests that, given
that secondary schools, an important portion of talent-based sorting takes
place along the academic/vocational divide, as witnessed by the sign and the
statistical significance of the interaction coefficients, rather than along the
public/private dimension. Interestingly, and consistently with our theoreti-
cal perspective, there is negative interaction between private school atten-
dance and talent. 
6 When the public sector already sorts students by talent into different tracks (academic,
technical or vocational), which may be different in terms of peers, teachers’ quality, and resour-
ce availability, we expect a lower return to paying a positive price to self-selection into a private
school. However, given that school tracks differ in terms of labor market prospects, within each
track our general model continues to apply.
TABLE 6c – Probability of college enrolment – probit and IV probit – 
marginal effects – ISTAT 1998-2001-2004
5 6 7 8
1998 survey (graduate in 1995)
COLLEGE SELECTED COLLEGE SELECTED
PROBIT IF INTO PROBIT IF INTO
PRIVATE PRIVATE PUBLIC PUBLIC
female
0.0771 0.2298 -0.0007 -0.226
[1.19] [9.38]*** [0.03] [9.18]***
22 year old
0.3549 -0.2523 0.0291 0.2458
[5.64]*** [9.00]*** [1.17] [8.79]***
talent (1st factor extracted from votes 0.3281 -0.0742 0.5255 0.075
and repetition) [11.25]*** [5.59]*** [43.68]*** [5.65]***
father college degree
0.6666 0.3599 0.7292 -0.3563
[5.54]*** [8.42]*** [13.10]*** [8.26]***
mother college degree
0.517 0.2677 0.7187 -0.2622
[4.28]*** [5.50]*** [11.75]*** [5.34]***
at least one graduate grandparent
- 
resorting to private tuitions
0.1333 -0.1607
[3.06]*** [3.56]***
Observations 20013 20013 20013 20013
Log likelihood -8281.2 -17036.5
Robust z statistics in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Regional dummies included in the selection equation.
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As a robustness check for the results reported in Table 5, in Table 8 we
exclude regional dummies from the instrument set while including parental
occupation (whether father and mother were self-employed when the stu-
dent was 14-year-old), grandparents graduation (in 1998 and 2001), use of
individual tutoring lessons (in 2004), and the regional share of students at-
tending private secondary school.7 The results in the first three columns in-
dicate that these variables do predict private school attendance. Self-em-
ployment of parents is positively associated with private schooling, which is
not surprising since families of self-employed workers may be richer, and/or
more interested in educational status, and may also appreciate the longer
hours and higher flexibility of private schools’ schedules. Grandparents’ edu-
cation and use of individual tutoring lessons also raise the probability of pri-
vate enrolment. Finally, the student share in private schools at regional le-
vel exhibits a positive correlation in the data. Thus the first requirement for
a good instrument (correlation with the endogenous variable) is passed. Co-
lumns 4 to 6 of Table 8 detect little correlation with the dependent variable.
Parental self-employment and share of students in private display almost no
correlation with college enrolment, while the variable related to the cultural
capital of the family (grandparental education, use of private individual tu-
toring) preserve their statistical significance, despite the inclusion of father
and mother university education. In the final three columns of Table 8 we
show the results of IV probit estimation, where all proposed instruments are
included. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 5, and quan-
titatively stronger. Graduating from a private secondary school is associated
with a premium in the probability of college attendance (in 2001 sample),
but the marginal return to talent in private schooling is lower than in public
schools (in the 1998 and 2004 surveys this effect is significant at the 10% le-
vel). Remarkably, in this case the point estimate of the interaction coefficient
is so large as to imply a negative return to talent in private schools.
Since individuals are only surveyed very soon after exiting secondary
school, the available data are poorly suited to estimating the effectiveness of
private and public schooling in determining labour market success. It is still
interesting, however, to estimate a (log)wage function, correcting for selection
into employment using Heckman’s two-step procedure. Unlike those meant to
assess the role of secondary schooling in determining university enrolment, the
7 In order to capture the role of local private school availability at the beginning of the schoo-
ling career, one should measure it five years before graduation (plus years of repetition). To ma-
ke things simpler we have chosen an intermediate year (1992-93), which is identical across sur-
veys. Since the finest identifier is the region, we matched the information on a regional base. The
student share in private schools ranges from 2.16% in Sardinia to 14.7% of Liguria.
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estimation procedure treats private school attendance as an exogenous varia-
ble rather than an endogenous choice. The data are generated by a double self-
selection (first between public and private and then between paid employment
and other labour market status), but neglecting the former may not bias
strongly our estimates of returns to talent, because high-talent individuals tend
to be sorted into public schools and to be engaged in further study (even when
they attended private schools) three years after graduation. According to our
earlier estimates, high talent is not as likely to lead to University for students
who attended private schools as for students who attended public schools.
Thus, the sample available for estimation of wage-terms returns to talent cer-
tainly over-represents low-talent students, but may well be representative in
terms of the interaction of talent with the private/public dimension.
In Table 9, selection into employment is controlled by parental back-
ground and secondary school types, which identify the selection equation
and are excluded from the wage-determination equation, which features
gender, age, and talent. Young females suffer a wage differential in the or-
der of 20%, while talent reduces the probability of being employed but in-
creases the corresponding earnings. Having attended a private school is in-
significantly correlated with the wage level, but the interaction of that
dummy variable with talent is estimated to be negative (and significantly so
in the most recent wave). To illustrate the qualitative consistency of these re-
sults with our theoretical perspective, we display in Figure 4 the data from
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FIGURE 4 - Probability of college enrolment – ISTAT 2001
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the most recent wave in the same format as our theoretical Figure 1 above,
along with the predicted probability of college enrolment by type of school
attended. Figure 5 reports the corresponding information as regards ear-
nings: the early schooling career summarized by the empirical “talent” proxy
is almost irrelevant to earnings in the case of public school graduates, and
has a negative slope point estimate among those who enrolled in private
schools. These empirical diagrams are qualitatively similar to panel (b) of
Figure 1, indicating that in the Italian secondary education system private
schools are configured so as to attract students from the bottom end of the
talent distribution. 
5. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Our theoretical perspective and empirical results suggest that in Italy pri-
vate schools attract children who hail from relatively rich families but are dif-
ficult to educate, while public schools reward talent strongly enough to at-
tract a better pool of students. As long as peer effects are relevant, the lower
quality of private schools’ student bodies implies a similarly low quality (for
similar resources) of the education offered by this segment of the market. 
Such a configuration contrasts sharply with standard views and evi-
dence from Anglo-Saxon countries, where quality differentiation across
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FIGURE 5 - Predicted wage conditional on selection into employment – ISTAT 2001
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8 Brunello - Checchi (2005) review the current Italian experience with school vouchers, sho-
wing that in most cases they are offered unconditionally, thus actually reducing the equality of
opportunity, since they work as a regressive subsidy.
schools reflects their private costs, and loans or targeted subsidies (rather
than uniform public school funding) could allow talented poor students to
attend private schools. By preventing borrowing constraints from distorting
the allocation of students across schools that best reflects cost and efficiency
considerations, school vouchers can increase the equality of opportunity, as
long as they are correctly targeted to needy students.8 But if private schools
serve a remedial purpose, and in the light of informational and organizatio-
nal failures of the private market for education, the efficiency properties of
voucher schemes and other quasi-market arrangements are not obvious. Pro-
viding subsidized or free education to higher-quality students may be effi-
cient, depending on how costly it is for the State to do so. And the political
attractiveness of high-quality public schools depends on such subsidies’ dis-
tributional implications, which are also ambiguous in general and depend
on the relationship between what we call “talent” and the material well-being
of households. 
Both aspects deserve to be modelled in further work. Doing so would
make it possible to explain through politico-economic mechanisms why in
Italy (in contrast to the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries) pu-
blic schools have traditionally been demanding, selective, and productive as
regards students’ efforts and abilities, leaving a mostly remedial role to the
private sector’s supply of education. Further theoretical and empirical work
would also offer insights on the distributional implications, across indivi-
duals with different financial and cultural endowments, of voucher pro-
grams, other forms of private school subsidization, and more general aspects
of schooling systems’ structure and reform.
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